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ABSTRACT 
Political disagreement, both interpersonally and universally, undermines the 
prospect of a central ideological meeting point. While there is much research to 
connect individual traits with political preference, less exists on the ways in which 
these differences might be alleviated. Particularly, more must be done to scrutinize the 
specific language we use and the persuasive effects that it carries. This study utilizes 
moral language preferable by either Conservatives or Liberals in a persuasive 
experiment designed to persuade Liberals and Conservatives respectively to favor an 
issue of the opposing political party. A 2x3 experimental design presented respondents 
with an issue that their party would not typically agree with, using moral language that 
they would. The experiment designed to persuade Conservatives used both loyalty and 
purity language, while the experiment designed to persuade Liberals used fairness 
language. Results indicate that differences in political preference were significant, and 
that fairness language (i.e. justice, equality, opportunity) was most effective in 
persuading both Republican and Democratic respondents on the issues of 
making English the official language of the United States, and universal health care. 
Both purity and loyalty frames were not found to be significant. Implications and 
future considerations are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ideological differences have never been more relevant in American society. 
Political polarization, both interpersonally and universally, implicates our continuous 
migration from a central ideological meeting point. Though a wide margin of variables 
may play a role in the increase of political polarization – modern media, 
demographics, and environmental factors, to name a few – the focus of this study is to 
look at individual traits like personality, political preference, and moral values through 
an interpersonal communicative lens.  
A majority of the discussion on this topic revolves around the causes of 
polarization and interpersonal disagreement. However, less exists on the ways in 
which these differences and disagreements can be alleviated. Put differently, the 
relationship between polarization and persuasion is lacking in present research. The 
overarching goal of this thesis is to determine a way to find common ground through 
interpersonal communication. More specifically, this study aims to determine the 
persuasive effects of targeted language on the attitudes we hold and its subsequent 
implication on the discipline of communication and on society as a whole. The 
intersection of the communication, psychology, and political science disciplines 
informs this interdisciplinary research paper to provide a framework towards 
imploring more centralized political conversations with one another. 
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My interest in this area is rooted in the ideological political divide between 
people who otherwise might have found common ground. By nature of attribution 
error, we often overlook that even our worst enemies believe themselves to be doing 
the right thing. Communication and a prior understanding of one’s beliefs and traits 
seem to be a concrete and effective way to find common ground on any given 
ideological issue. By framing a message to fit within ones existing attitudes, 
persuasion could be more likely to occur, but further research must be conducted to 
concretely confirm this notion. For example, someone who has historically exhibited 
religious prejudice may not react positively to a message that vehemently denounces 
their stance. However, framed differently, that same individual may be more receptive 
to that message. And while political polarization is more pervasive now than ever 
before, there is also global access to public information like never before. The ubiquity 
of social media makes it all too easy to acquire access to someone’s belief systems by 
way of public social profiles.  
An underlying goal of this research project is prejudice reduction. Because 
political attitudes are so frequently linked with social prejudices, it seemed a natural fit 
to draw a connection between the two ideologies. Although this study will focus on 
finding common ground on a variety of different issues and political stances, the 
intention of this thesis is to utilize the research design and existing body of knowledge 
to understand the ways in which common ground can be found in instances where 
ones attitudes may lead to prejudicial harm. 
This study does not purport itself to ‘turn Conservatives liberal’ or vice versa, 
as many have tried to do. It also does not intend to compromise the autonomy of 
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individuals’ political decision-making process, nor use a tactic of manipulation for 
political gain. The objective is to unveil the ways in which people can interpersonally 
reason with and understand each other, and its implication on both our interpersonal 
relationships and society as a whole. I will first conduct a review of the literature on 
the intersection of attitude change via persuasion, personality theory, and moral 
foundations, and analyze their relationship with political ideology. Then, upon 
drawing a connection between personality and political preference through the 
mediating role of moral values, I will examine the effects of reframing a message 
using moral values on political persuasion and discuss its greater implication on the 
field of communication as a whole.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Communication and Persuasion 
Persuasion is the intentional attempt to alter the attitude(s) of another 
individual via any method of communication (Perloff, 2010). Persuasion can be 
achieved through a plethora of tactics and influenced by numerous factors. For 
example, the messenger and relevance of argument can play a role in persuasion, as 
well as environment and demographics. According to research on attitude and attitude 
change, attitudes have three branches: a cognitive component (involving human 
thought), an affective component (regarding human emotion), and a behavioral 
component (referring to dispositional factors) (Triandis, 1971). In order for attitude 
change to occur, one of these components must be altered.  
What we know about attitude is that it is learned and influences our thoughts 
and actions (Perloff, 2010, p. 43). We also know that “attitudes – particularly political 
ones – are characterized by emotional reactions, sweeping sentiments, and powerful 
prejudices” (Perloff, 2010, p. 52). 
Within the discipline of communication, social judgment theory, the theory of 
reasoned action, theory of planned behavior, and elaboration likelihood model among 
many others are considered core theories of persuasion (Perloff, 2010). Social 
judgment theory in particular plays a strong role in the understanding of attitude shift 
with regard to this study.  
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Social Judgment Theory  
The theory of social judgment was first developed by Carolyn Sherif, Muzafer 
Sherif, and Carl Hovland in 1965 (Perloff, 2010). The theory is inherently an attitude-
based persuasion theory and suggests that message receivers do not analyze a message 
purely on its content, but rather compare it first to their existing beliefs and make a 
judgment based on that understanding (Perloff, 2010). Further, the original researchers 
postulate that real persuasion occurs when a message falls into our latitude of non-
commitment, or an idea or issue that we don’t feel too strongly one way or another 
(Perloff, 2010). If an individual holds a strong opinion on an issue either too positively 
or too negatively, the issue falls into the latitude of rejection and persuasion typically 
will not occur (Perloff, 2010). However, the general assumption is that humans don’t 
feel passionately about all too many issues, and so persuasion via this route is likely.  
 Since its inception, a number of studies on social judgment theory have been 
introduced, and they frequently focus on social issues. A 1972 study on attitude 
towards birth control found individuals with wide latitudes of acceptance on that topic 
exhibited opinion change through a persuasive communication on that subject (Eagly, 
Telaak, & Lanzetta, 1972). In addition, those who showed medium or narrow latitudes 
of acceptance did not change their opinion or perspective (Eagly, Telaak, & Lanzetta, 
1972). Another study presented 80 members of a pro-life organization with a 
persuasive message that fell outside of their existing attitude, but within their latitude 
of noncommitment (Sarup, Suchner, & Gaylord, 1991). Results were staggering, and 
overwhelmingly support the idea that social judgments correlate with attitude change 
(Sarup, Suchner, & Gaylord, 1991). 
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Persuasibility 
 A surplus of variables can be at play when considering persuasibility. This 
includes – but is not limited to – sex differences, environmental factors, 
developmental components, and definitive predispositions, in addition to factors such 
as argument strength, relationship with the persuader, and emotional elements (Janis, 
1959).  
Though a study could look at any number of these factors in relation with 
persuasion, there is significant and consistent research in the realm of dispositional 
factors (sometimes called persuasibility factors, or predispositions) (Janis, 1959). 
Personality traits – or variables of individual difference – are key dispositional 
components (Pervin & John, 1999, p. 140).   
The Role of Personality 
Persuasive communications relating to personality are comprised of a 
combination of existing attitudes, perceptions, and personal preferences more so than 
an isolated act of persuasion (Janis, 1959).  Though a number of varying personality 
theories exist, the subject matter of this research calls for a theory that permits 
characterization of individual traits in order to make generalizations about the 
communicatee. Because traits influence behavior, (Mondak, 2010, p. 7), it seems only 
intuitive to further investigate how and why personality affects persuasion. Therefore, 
I will first narrow in on the “big five” personality traits, or the five-factor model.  
The big five include extraversion (outgoing/reserved), agreeableness 
(compassionate/suspicious), conscientiousness (organized/spontaneous), neuroticism 
(stressfulness/confidence), and openness (flexibility/rigidity) (Hogan, Johnson, & 
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Briggs, 1997). According to the five-factor model, adults can be characterized into any 
combination of these five traits that influence thoughts, feelings, and actions (Pervin & 
John, 1999, p. 145). This particular personality theory suggests that humans exhibit a 
distinctive blend of these five traits to make up who we are. The big five are thought 
to be consistent from childhood through adulthood and determine the ways we interact 
with one another and influence how we form attitudes and opinions (Hogan, Johnson, 
& Briggs, 1997). Attitude formation is a key variable in this research subject, and 
therefore warrants a closer look at the role that personality disposition plays in 
political preference. With this in mind, personality will be a core focus of this paper to 
provide a framework for analyzing our inherent traits and decision-making processes. 
Personality and Political Orientation 
Social scientists have long sought to find connections between personality and 
political preference (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, political preference will refer to the two core political parties of present-day 
America, including liberal or democratic ideologies, and conservative or republican 
ideologies. A number of studies have tested various hypotheses derived from 
personality theory to determine whether patterns exist across the American political 
spectrum. The most consistent finding across personality and political research is that 
Liberals tend to be connected with openness to experience, where Conservatives are 
frequently linked with conscientiousness (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Put 
differently, Liberals “are generally more openminded in their pursuit of creativity, 
novelty, and diversity, whereas Conservatives’ lives are more orderly, conventional, 
and neat” (Carney et al., 2008). Other studies also link agreeableness with liberalism, 
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and connect politeness with conservatism (Hirsh, Deyoung, Xiaowen, & Peterson, 
2010).  
Additional research also points to the notion that there may be differences in 
social and economic attitudes across political preferences (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, & Ha, 2010). For example, agreeableness is found to be associated with both 
economic liberalism and social conservatism, implying that ideological attitudes 
within political stances can vary depending on the issue (Gerber et al., 2010). 
Generally, results are only replicable in the environment from which they derive, but 
there is some research to suggest that similar implications can be drawn from studies 
conducted in different countries and cultures. For example, one Italian study found 
that Moderate voters who leaned towards the right exhibited traits of 
conscientiousness, while Moderates who leaned towards the political left displayed 
agreeableness and openness, consistent with American studies (Capara, Barbaranelli, 
& Zimbardo, 1999).  
Nevertheless, a definitive correlation between personality and political 
orientation has been historically more difficult to prove. In one such study, the 
presence of political ideology is found to exist beyond the realm of traceable 
personality types (Feldman & Huddy, 2014). When looking at neuroticism, Huddy and 
Feldman found that, although conscientiousness and a lack of openness can be 
connected with conservatism, neuroticism cannot (Feldman & Huddy, 2014). Some 
researchers also report that, with the exception of openness, political orientation 
cannot be determined by personality, directly (Alford, Funk & Hibbing, 2005). 
Though substantial evidence does indicate a correlation between personality and 
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political preference, I was unable to find research on the role of persuasion in this 
equation. In other words, there is not much research to suggest that prior knowledge of 
one’s personality traits can better inform our conversations – political or otherwise – 
to reach an ideological meeting point. The traits are simply too broad, and a more 
direct correlation needs to be established in order to discuss parallels between 
personality and political preference. However, others have found that personality and 
political opinion are directly connected through the mediating role of moral values. It 
is within this area that a connection can be traced, and a politically persuasive research 
design begins to emerge.  
This connection between personality, moral values, and political preferences is 
best illustrated using the personality system model. The personality system model 
(PSM) provides a strong framework for this relationship between political orientation 
and personality theory. In essence, it attempts to institute a relationship between 
behavior and personality through character (Lewis and Bates, 2011). The PSM 
measures different “levels” of domain. In this particular case, Level 1 includes our 
most basic tendencies like personality (Lewis and Bates, 2011). Level 2 measures our 
characteristic adaptions or our moral values (Lewis and Bates, 2011). Finally, Level 3 
measures our behaviors or, in the case of this paper, political behavior (Lewis and 
Bates, 2011). One particular key study found that introducing the mediating factor of 
moral values to individuals reveals connections to both personality factors and 
political orientation (Lewis and Bates, 2011). While a tie between personality and 
political orientation might be more difficult to trace, the use of the personality system 
model allows a line to be drawn from disposition to behavior through moral values. 
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The implication here is critical: if a correlation exists between personality, moral 
values, and political opinion, then prior knowledge of moral predispositions could help 
lead to stronger, more amicable political conversations.   
Within this area of study is where the intersection of these variables of political 
orientation, personality, and moral values begin to come together. An example of this 
is found in the authoritarian trait, which refers to the complete adherence to policy or 
laws dictated by another person or group (Hogan, Johnson, & Briggs, 1997). One core 
study from 1970 convinced individuals they were being interviewed on the basis of 
public opinion but were instead given a statement presented as a ‘fact’ that directly 
contradicted their stance on a given issue (Centers, Shomer, & Rodrigues, 1970). 
Results indicate that those who exhibit higher levels of authoritarianism are most 
likely to change their opinion after being presented with concrete research (Centers, 
Shomer, & Rodrigues, 1970). The results of this study indicate a preference for facts 
under the authoritarian trait. A second study looked at the presence of threat and scare 
tactics (Lavine et al., 1999).  It surveyed young voting American citizens one week 
before a Presidential election and found that those who exhibited higher levels of 
authoritarianism were more susceptible to persuasion via threatening messages 
(Lavine et al., 1999).  
Though authoritarianism is a derivative of personality theory, the trait of 
authority is a moral value. As discussed, this creates a pathway from personality to 
moral values, and ultimately to political preference. Through this connection of 
personality and political preference is how the subject of morals comes to be the 
prevalent focus of this paper. Upon completing a comprehensive review of literature 
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surrounding personality theory and persuasion, morals were omnipresent. Studies on 
the nature of sinning (Jonason, Zeigler-Hill, & Okan, 2017), hedonism (Ksendzova, 
Iyer, Hill, Wojcik, & Howell 2015), and – as outlined above – the political spectrum, 
tell us that a link between personality and moral foundations is likely. While 
personality theory maps the pathway to morality, the understanding of moral values 
creates a more applicable route for reframing a message with the goal of persuasion. 
And unlike personality traits, which are traditionally static dispositional factors, moral 
judgements can be influenced by knowledge, and are therefore much more susceptible 
to change via persuasive interactions (Emler, 2003). This thesis hinges on that 
statement. If we can familiarize ourselves with preexisting generalities – like moral 
values – we can better understand how to communicate with an individual, using 
language that they understand. 
The Role of Political Attitudes 
I have thus far discussed the factors that influence persuasion and the role that 
dispositional traits play in the process. I’ve also discussed the lack of evidence to 
definitively suggest that personality directly relates to political preference, but that 
political preference can be determined through the mediating role of moral values. 
One potential explanation for this is that, when it comes to political attitudes, those 
who value ideology consider social and political issues very differently than those who 
do not (Perloff, 2010, p. 54). “Unlike many people, who respond to issues primarily on 
their basis of simple symbolic predispositions, ideologues begin with an ideology, and 
their attitudes flow from this” (Perloff, 2010, p. 54). In other words, when considering 
the relationship between attitude change and politics, it’s not enough to look at only 
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dispositional factors. A discussion on moral values and key theories in attitude change 
within the discipline of political science is a necessary component to this topic. 
For example, the theory of motivated reasoning suggests that people naturally 
form beliefs based on preexisting perceptions (Herrmann, 2017). Though logic 
suggests that dissemination of information on a subject would lead to a more common 
ideological meeting point, the opposite occurs (Herrmann, 2017). In fact, people 
“rewrite reality around their favored course of action” by applying logic to their own 
preferences (Herrmann, 2017). Emotions play a strong role in this hypothesis as well. 
A 2017 study found that positive attachment to one’s own home nation directly 
correlated with how they felt about other nations who were portrayed to either help or 
harm that country (Hermann, 2017). For example, if someone feels deeply connected 
with their United States citizenship, and is told that a Middle Eastern country is a 
threat to national security, that same person will both understand the statement to be a 
pure fact, and also interpret future information regarding that subject to fit specifically 
into their personal belief system. In particular, the concept of loyalty plays a large role 
in this dynamic, as loyalty is a moral value as well.  
In a second study that examined climate change and attitude change via the 
theory of reasoned action, evidence consistent with ones existing political beliefs was 
viewed as the stronger argument (Palm, Lewis, and Feng, 2017). In relation to climate 
change, the research team found that ideology and political party were more likely to 
predict opinion change over time than fact-based information on climate change 
(Palm, Lewis, and Feng, 2017). The only examples of opinion change in this instance 
are the statements where participants’ opinion aligned with ones own party. More 
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specifically, this study was directed towards Republicans, given that “79% of liberal 
Democrats but only 15% of conservative Republicans” believe that the earth is 
warming as a result of human activity, despite the fact that 97% of scientists agree that 
climate change exists (Palm, Lewis, and Feng, 2017). The study found that 
Republicans were only likely to change their opinion to acknowledge climate change 
when it aligned with their party leaders and peers’ mindsets (Palm, Lewis, and Feng, 
2017). This phenomenon especially supports the notion that partisan and moral-based 
language is more persuasive in attitude change than an unbiased presentation of “fact”. 
In order for a political message to be truly persuasive, it should somewhat align with 
ones existing political attitudes.  
Additional research centered around personality and political opinion also 
arrives at this same conclusion. Following the terror attacks on the United States on 
September 11th, 2001, surveys found that citizens expressed heavy support for 
increased security and war policies that did not align with Americans’ public opinion 
historically (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). One particular study found that while those 
who already exhibited authoritarian attitudes maintained their pro-war stance after the 
attacks, those who did not previously hold pro-authoritarian attitudes became more 
inclined to support tighter security and more aggressive war policies (Hetherington & 
Suhay, 2011). This further supports the idea that, when the frame of information is 
congruent with ones own beliefs and party values, individuals are more likely to 
demonstrate attitude change.    
Moral Foundations Theory  
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Congruent with the theories previously listed, moral foundations theory (MFT) 
encompasses the notion of morals and persuasive framing in a way that sets up a 
strong framework for the basis of this study. Stemming from moral psychology, moral 
foundations theory attempts to explain the variance in human moral values and 
reasoning (Graham et al., 2012). Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt spearheaded this 
area of research that focuses on basic moral ideological differences and how morals 
relate to political ideology. Where preference-based stances are often situational, 
morally charged opinions exist because of a deeply held belief (Graham et al., 2012). 
Researchers in moral psychology had long understood issues of moral difference to 
center around harm, rights, and justice (Haidt & Graham, 2007). However, in seeking 
to understand how politics intersect with moral ideology, Graham and Haidt 
hypothesize that Conservatives relate to morals that Liberals don’t even recognize: 
ingroup, purity, and authority (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Graham and Haidt 
hypothesize that there are actually five foundations of moralities: “harm/care 
(minimizing or increasing harm to others), fairness/reciprocity (equality assurance), 
ingroup/loyalty (importance of the immediate ingroup), authority/respect (respect for 
hierarchy and status), and purity/sanctity (avoiding impure or disgusting acts)” (Haidt 
& Graham, 2007). The researchers go on to theorize that while Conservatives rely on 
all five moral foundations, Liberals only reason with harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009).  
In response to these results, Graham and Haidt, along with their research team, 
developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire as a way to “map the moral domain, 
account for cultural differences, and discover moral prejudices” (Graham et al., 2011). 
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Upon testing these results, later studies find that moral foundations predict judgements 
of key political issues such as abortion, immigration, and same-sex marriage more 
accurately than demographic generalizations such as age, gender, or even interest in 
politics (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt 2012).  
This group of studies in particular creates a direct tie between factors like 
personality with morals and political preference. The research in this area has the 
biggest implication on polarization as a whole. If we can understand the foundations 
that motivate different individuals – in this case, morals – we can better understand 
how to rephrase a message in order for attitude change to occur. It was from these 
implications that research of the effects of moral framing on political persuasion came 
about. 
Much like the studies aiming to connect personality and political preference, 
there are also a plethora of studies concretely connecting moral values with political 
preference. One such study found that both persuasion (cross-cutting opinion) and 
entrenching (affirming one’s opinion) were possible through moral foundations theory 
(Day, Fiske, Downing & Trail, 2014). Day et al. administered a test of different moral 
foundational framings to determine whether exposure to moral frames effects political 
positions. Their two-part study surveyed Liberals on conservative issues through 
liberal moral frames, and Conservatives on liberal issues using conservative moral 
frames (Day et al., 2014). Those who were exposed to a stance they already agreed 
with - through a moral they already relate to - felt more strongly about those opinions 
afterwards (Day et al., 2014). The researchers defined this as entrenching, and it 
occurred on both ends of the political spectrum (Day et al., 2014). Conversely, and in 
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support of the hypothesis behind this paper, their study found that Conservatives were 
susceptible to the persuasion hypothesis. Conservatives who were shown a stance they 
didn’t agree with – through a moral value that they adhere to – were more likely to be 
persuaded to cross cut opinion (Day et al., 2014). Interestingly, Liberals who were 
shown a conservative stance they didn’t agree with through a liberal moral frame did 
not change their attitudes one way or another as did Conservative samples (Day et al., 
2014). The comprehensive study carries great implications for crossing the political 
divide via moral foundations and message reframing as a form of persuasion. Further, 
much like social judgment theory, this study outlines a way in which persuasion can 
occur by moving ones attitude from point A to point B using a persuasive message.   
Similarly, another study found that when pro-environmental positions were 
enforced using a common ‘ingroup’ moral foundation, Conservatives were more likely 
to agree with environmentally friendly attitudes (Wolsko, 2017). However, the same 
tests conducted on Liberals to convince them of anti-environmental stances did not 
manage to persuade them – Liberals still reinforced pro-environmental attitudes 
(Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2016).   
When considering individual motivations and perceptions of moral 
foundations, participants have been found not to recognize the degree to which they 
utilize moral principles. For example, a 2016 study found that the disparities between 
Conservatives and Liberals were much greater than participants indicated, implying 
that individuals don’t recognize their own polarized frames of communication 
(Rempala, Okdie, & Garvey, 2016). Also intriguing is that, when tested, participants 
reach for their own strong moral values rather than the values of those whose opinion 
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they are trying to change (Feinberg and Willer, 2015). This falls in line with another 
Haidt and Graham study from 2012 that indicates the degree to which Liberals and 
Conservatives stereotype both themselves and each other is more extreme than actual 
indicated differences (Graham, Nosek, Haidt & Young, 2012). These three studies 
suggest to researchers that communicators are not typically aware of these moral 
differences and are not likely to reach for a different moral frame as a method to find 
common ground. This finding provides additional support to this paper’s goal of 
understanding another’s perspective and reshaping a communicative message to better 
fit into the communicatee’s latitude of acceptance.  
As with any theory, there are some results that refute initial findings of Haidt 
and Graham. A study conducted in 2013 found that Liberals and Conservatives share 
the morals of care, fairness, and purity when making decisions about influential 
people, implying that differences between political parties may have been 
overexaggerated in the original research (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 
2013).  Further, the theory does not necessarily replicate congruently in all samples. 
Culture should be considered a prominent variable in studies on moral foundations 
(Haidt, 2007). One study found that moral foundations theory does not replicate well 
with Black samples, as Black Americans are both historically more religious and more 
liberal than White American samples (Davis et al., 2016). Both of these studies 
suggest that moral foundations may be context-dependent and change in the presence 
of other variables.  
Future Considerations 
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 A few gaps in the research exist, as well as routes for future study. First, a 
consideration of additional mediating constructs to connect personality with political 
behavior should be explored (Lewis and Bates, 2011). Though moral values are a key 
mediating factor, there may be other factors worth considering as mediators, including 
social dominance orientation (Lewis and Bates, 2011). Emergence of a second 
mediating factor could present an alternative set of values to inform original research 
on moral foundations theory.  
 Secondly, future research might test how moral foundations theory applies to 
spaces beyond politics, such as the workplace, marketing, communities, small groups, 
etc. (Day et al., 2014). Moral foundations may replicate differently outside the 
contexts of Conservative and Liberal groups. The implication here suggests that moral 
foundations can provide the framework for finding middle ground in varying contexts, 
not just politics.  
 Also, studies that outline inconsistencies between Liberals and Conservatives 
should either be retested using a different sample to determine if other variables are at 
play, or whether Conservatives are perhaps truly more open to new ideas and/or more 
susceptible to persuasion than Liberals. 
Finally, though the comprehensive research discussed has analyzed the 
relationship between moral values with both personality and persuasibility, far less has 
been done to connect the variables of personality and opinion change directly through 
moral values. In other words, research could survey pre-existing knowledge of 
dispositional factors like personality and moral values in order to rephrase a message 
to fit into one’s latitude of acceptance. Researchers could also design a study that uses 
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the influence of big five personality theory to determine whether these traits can carry 
the same persuasive force as moral foundations. 
Such a study would advance the field of communication by drawing from the 
disciplines of political science and psychology to inform the modern problem of 
political polarization. In learning more about message reframing, we can address the 
ways in which we individually contribute to ideological culture wars and begin to find 
a way to meet in the middle. 
The research question to consider is therefore one that acknowledges the 
variables of persuasion, political orientation, and attitude. This thesis considers the 
following research question:  
RQ1: Is morally charged language persuasive?  
In order to answer RQ1, this study investigates the use of targeted political 
language on individuals who hold an opposing political stance to collect data on the 
persuasive effects of moral framing. This thesis therefore considers whether a liberal 
message framed using language that resonates with Conservatives is persuasive to 
Conservatives, and whether a conservative issue framed with language that resonates 
with Liberals is persuasive to Liberals. The reasoning behind this line of thinking is to 
draw a bottom line about the trait differences that define different political groups, and 
how that information can subsequently be used to understand the motivations behind 
that ideology. Because existing research indicates that Liberals resonate with 
individualizing language and Conservatives with binding language, the following 
hypotheses are proposed below: 
 20 
 
H1: A liberal issue reframed with a binding moral will have a liberally persuasive 
effect on Conservatives. 
H2: A conservative issue reframed with an individualizing moral will have a 
conservatively persuasive effect on Liberals. 
Previous research points to these hypotheses as a potential explanation for 
polarization and political variance, suggesting that a bottom line can be drawn to 
generalize about each individual group, and help understand variance in political 
attitudes and the effects of moral reasoning.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Overview 
The goal of this research is to measure participants’ political stance, moral 
frames on political stances, and the persuasion that occurs as a result of these 
experiments. For the sake of this study, Liberal is defined as anyone who identifies 
with the American Democratic political party, and Conservative is defined as anyone 
who identifies with the American Republican party. Polarization refers to the growing 
ideological divide in political stances. Moral foundations refer to the variance in 
human moral reasoning. Binding morals refer to those which are traditionally 
conservative in nature, and individualizing morals will refer to those which are liberal 
in nature. 
Participants 
The participants of this research study consisted of students in three separate 
large lecture style undergraduate classes at the University of Rhode Island. The first 
was COM 381 (Research Methods in Communication), and the second and third were 
two separate class sections of PSC 116 (International Politics). In total, approximately 
650 surveys were distributed, and 461 completed responses were collected using 
volunteer sampling to recruit respondents. Participants’ responses were completely 
anonymous, and no discrimination in respondent selection took place. Students were 
asked to self-identify demographic information. In total, 450 respondents were aged 
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18-24 (97.6%), 10 were aged 25-34 (2.2%), and 1 was age 35-44 (.2%). Both males 
and females were surveyed: 222 (48.2%) identified as female and 235 (51.1%) 
identified as male. There were a small number of respondents who identified as ‘other’ 
for a total of four participants (.9%). Most participants identified as White, for a total 
of 359 (77%). This was followed by 40 Hispanic respondents (8.7%), 27 Black 
respondents (5.9%), 20 Asian respondents (4.3%), 4 Native American respondents 
(.9%), and finally 10 ‘other or multiracial’ respondents (2.2%). One participant chose 
not to self-identify their race/ethnicity. Socioeconomic economic status was recorded 
as well. 35 (7.6%) reported earning $100,000 or more in their household per year. This 
was followed by 34 (7.4%) falling between $90,000 and $99,999, 30 (6.5%) falling 
between $80,000 and $89,999, 30 (6.5%) falling between $60,000 and $69,999, 25 
(5.4%) falling between $50,000 and $59,999, 22 (4.8%) falling between $40,000 and 
$49,999, 20 (4.3&) falling between $30,000 and $39,999, 17 (3.7%) falling between 
$20,000 and $29,999, 13 (2.8%) falling between $0 and $9,999, and finally 9 (2.0%) 
falling between $10,000 and $19,999.   
Data collection and survey implementation took place during the Spring 2019 
academic semester. The respondents were given 10 minutes of class time to complete 
the survey, but the link remained open for 48 hours to accommodate any additional 
submissions.  
Procedure 
This study design utilized a quantitative survey method consisting of Likert 
scale questions and morally framed passages. Participants were primed on the survey 
during class time and informed that the study would ask them to respond to questions 
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on their political attitudes to determine where college students fall on the political 
spectrum, but not that a persuasive experiment would take place. All respondents who 
completed the survey were offered classroom credit at the discretion of the professor 
of the course. Participants were offered an alternative set of questions focused on 
personality type, the 50 question BFPTSQ (Big Five Personality Trait Short 
Questionnaire) (Morizot, 2014) (see Appendix G), if they indicated discomfort 
towards taking a survey on political opinion but still wished to earn classroom credit. 
However, no participants chose to select this option. Surveys were administered via an 
anonymous link through Sakai by the professor of the class to ensure external validity 
of the sample. The survey took no more than 10 minutes to complete.  
Research Design 
 The research design of this study drew from multiple existing studies, namely 
Feinberg & Willer’s 2015 study entitled “From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral 
Arguments Facilitate Political Influence?”. The researchers created persuasive 
passages in 2015, three of which were replicated in this survey. Additionally, the 
general theory and moral language dictionary was used from Graham, Haidt, and 
Nosek’s dictionary of moral language from their 2009 study, “Liberals and 
Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations”. Though elements of 
these two studies were used, the survey was distributed in a unique study design.  
First, I administered a brief demographic questionnaire containing four 
questions on age, sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. All demographic questions 
are located in Appendix A. Then, respondents were asked to identify their political 
identity, ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrat, or not sure. In sum, 
 24 
 
there were 267 Democratic respondents and 146 Republican respondents, while 48 
respondents remained “unsure”. However, unlike the Feinberg & Willer study that this 
thesis draws from, I chose not to exclude respondents who answered “independent” or 
“not sure”. Rather, those respondents were led to additional questions that asked 
participants to identify whether they tend to lean more liberally or conservatively, in 
order to expand the sample size and respondent percentage. For the initial political 
identity question, a total of 176 (38.2%) participants answered, “not sure” or 
“independent”. However, when those respondents were presented with a follow up 
question asking them to select the party they most resonate with, only 48 (10.4%) 
remained “not sure”, suggesting that participants typically lean towards one political 
party. Therefore, those who answered “independent” or “not sure” were not omitted. 
After this initial set of questions, respondents were then given a series of political 
identity questions to determine whether they felt more connected with the political 
party they identify with, or the ideology of that party (see Appendix B). For example, 
respondents answered questions on a scale ranging from 1 to 4.0, 1=strongly disagree, 
2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree (i.e. when people criticize Democrats, it feels 
like a personal insult). The full range of political identity questions are located in 
Appendix B.  
Next, students answered a series of “feeling thermometers”, in which they 
moved a slider on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from extremely unfavorable to 
extremely favorable, on the following four political issues: same-sex marriage, 
military spending, adopting English as the official language of the United States, and 
Universal Healthcare. These sliders were randomized so that each participant saw the 
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prompts in a different order. Note that two of these topics are covered in the 
experiment portion of the survey, but two additional questions were added to avoid 
priming. Two of the sliders focused on pro-Liberal issues (same-sex marriage, 
universal health care) and two of the sliders focused on pro-Conservative issues 
(military spending, adopting English as the official language of the United States). 
Feeling thermometers gauged participants general attitudes towards social issues 
ranging from 1 to 7.0, where 1=very negative, 2=somewhat negative, 3=negative, 
4=neutral, 5=somewhat positive, 6=positive, 7=very positive. The full scale is located 
in Appendix C.  
Finally, a series of personality-based questions consisting of the TIPI (Ten 
Item Personality Inventory) scale were administered as distracting questions and were 
randomized to ensure that participants did not shift responses after reading and 
answering these questions. The full scale is located in Appendix D. Respondents 
answered personality questions on items such as extraversion, dependability, and 
stressfulness on a scale ranging from 1 to 7.0, 1=disagree strongly,  2=disagree 
moderately, 3=disagree a little, 4=neither agree nor disagree, 5 =agree a little, 6=agree 
moderately, 7=agree strongly. 
I then presented participants with persuasive arguments: the experimental 
portion of the survey (see Appendices E and F for full passages). These passages are 
framed as an argument in support of a political issue in favor of a liberal issue or a 
conservative issue: universal health care and adoption of English as the official 
language of the United States, respectively (Feinberg & Willer, 2015). These two 
issues were politically reframed and presented in the form of a short passage in favor 
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of that stance using either conservative (binding) or liberal (individualizing) language. 
Therefore, there are four messages in total: a liberal message and binding frame, a 
liberal message and an individualizing frame, a conservative message and binding 
frame, and a conservative message and individualizing frame. These paragraphs were 
“locked” for 30 seconds to ensure that students did not click through the page before 
they finished reading the passage. I then measured participants’ attitudes towards each 
of these paragraphs. For example, regarding universal health care, (“I am in favor of 
universal health care”) ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (neutral) to 7 (strongly 
disagree).  Hypothetically, each morally reframed message will be more persuasive to 
those with an opposing political viewpoint than those who read a message and moral 
frame that aligns with their political stance.  All sections used were originally adapted 
and empirically tested by Feinberg & Willer and are stated verbatim in Appendices E 
and F. However, the conservatively framed passage on English as the official language 
of the United States – “English as the Official USA Language” – was not part of the 
original researcher’s methodology, and I wrote it utilizing the dictionary of moral 
terms as defined by Haidt, Nosek and Graham (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009).  I 
also incorporated a section of the official language used in the 2016 Republican Party 
Platform regarding making English as the official language of the United States. This 
phrasing was taken verbatim and added to the persuasive paragraph (see Appendix E). 
Each participant was asked to read and answer questions on two messages: a 
health care argument and an official language argument. However, in order to ensure 
that participants were not primed or swayed by the messages, each student received a 
randomized combination of the message possibilities. The design was a 2x3 factorial 
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design, including both a conservative issue (official language) and a liberal issue 
(universal health care). Within those two categories, there were three possible 
messages: a persuasive message containing conservatively moral language and follow 
up questions, a persuasive message containing liberally moral language and follow up 
questions, and a control group who saw only the follow up questions. Each student 
saw one of the three versions in each category. See table 1 below for reference: 
 
Table 1: Experimental Design(s) 
 
The control existed to better validate the accuracy of the framed messages as 
the persuasive variable. Validity will be ensured by issuing every combination of 
messages to participants rather than allotting the same combination of messages to a 
larger group of respondents. Validity will also be ensured by utilizing a 7-point scale 
to measure agreement or disagreement. Because political issues and persuasion are not 
a matter of black and white, it will be more reliable to provide participants with a 
larger range. Reliability will be ensured by utilizing paragraphs and survey questions 
  Binding Frame Individualizing Frame Control 
 
 
 
Universal 
health care 
 
 
 
Liberal 
message 
Liberal message 
 
Binding (Purity) frame 
 
H1: Liberally 
persuasive to 
Conservatives 
 
Liberal message 
 
Individualizing (Fairness) 
frame 
 
Strengthen Liberal attitudes 
 
Health 
Care 
attitude 
questions 
only, no 
reading 
 
Adopting 
English as 
the official 
language of 
the United 
States 
 
 
 
 
Conservative 
message 
Conservative message 
 
Binding (Ingroup) 
frame 
 
Will strengthen 
Conservative attitudes 
Conservative message 
 
Individualizing (Fairness) 
frame 
 
H2: Conservatively 
persuasive to Liberals 
 
English 
Language 
as Official 
Language 
Attitude 
questions 
only, no 
reading 
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that have been empirically tested by Feinberg & Willer. Though the college aged 
population of this study may affect the external validity of this study, internal validity 
is nevertheless very strong as a result of the randomization and design of the 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Health Care Experiment 
Experiment 1 analyzed responses to attitudes on universal health care. 
Bonferroni post hoc mean comparisons were conducted to examine the differences 
between the control, and experimental conditions, as well as differences between 
Republican and Conservative respondents. MANOVA was used to test multiple 
dependent variables and independent variables (see Appendix H for full tables). The 
figures listed in Chapter 4 were created by replicating results via regression analysis. 
Overall, the multivariate tests for the Health Care Experiment show a 
significant main effect for political preference F(3, 461) = 76.189, p < .001,  η² = .361.   
There was a nonsignificant effect for the health care experiment F(6, 461) = 1.063, p < 
.383, η² = .008 overall.  
Between subject effects yielded significant results when the independent 
variable of political identity is compared with each dependent variable of attitude. The 
relationship between political identity and attitude towards favoring Universal Health 
Care is F(1, 461) = 218.262, p < .001, η² = .349. The relationship between political 
identity and attitude of no need for Universal Health Care is F(1, 461) = 171.172, p 
<.001, η² = .296. The relationship between political identity and attitude towards 
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Universal Health Care will solve the nation’s problems is F(1, 461) = 148.575, p < 
.001, η² = .267. 
 Between subject effects yielded insignificant results when the independent 
variable of the health care experimental conditions are compared with each dependent 
variable of attitude. The relationship between the health care experiment and attitude 
towards favoring universal health care is F(2, 461) = 2.797, p <.062, η² = .014. The 
relationship between the health care experiment and attitude of no need for Universal 
Health Care is F(2, 461) = 2.321, p < .099, η² = .011. The relationship between the 
health care experiment and attitude towards whether universal health care will solve 
the nation’s problems is F(2, 461) = 1.423, p < .242, η² = .007.  
 While the overall experimental treatment produced no significant results, 
significant data did occur under the specific frames of the experiment. Under the 
dependent variable “I am in favor of universal health care”, the fairness frame was 
significant p < .05 when compared with the control. Additionally, the dependent 
variable “There is no need for universal health care” yielded significant results under 
the fairness frame as well, where p < .05 when compared with the control.  
Figure 1: I am in favor of universal health care 
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Figure 2: There is no need for universal health care 
Figure 3: Universal health care would solve the nation’s problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More specifically, Hypothesis 1 states that a Liberal issue reframed with 
binding moral language will have a liberally persuasive effect on Conservatives. The 
data supports this notion but was not statistically significant. On the question of 
whether respondents were in favor of universal health care, Republicans in the control 
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(M = 4.27, SD = 1.634) were less in favor of universal health care than Republicans in 
the purity frame (M = 3.96, SD = 1.865) and the fairness frame (M = 3.63, SD = 
1.648). The fairness frame was most effective in persuading Republicans. Democratic 
responses were more stagnant, with the control (M = 2.03, SD = 1.198) more closely 
aligned with the fairness frame (M = 1.87, SD = 1.017) and the purity frame (M = 
1.85, SD = 1.010), respectively. Significant results were also seen under the dependent 
variable “There is no need for universal health care”, where Republicans in the control 
group (M = 3.94, SD = 1.626) differed from attitudes of those in the purity frame (M = 
4.25, SD = 1.820) and the fairness frame (M = 4.65, SD = 1.660). The fairness frame 
in this variable was also more effective in persuading Republicans. See Appendix H 
for full table of descriptive statistics.  
English as the Official Language of The US Experiment 
Overall, the multivariate tests for the official language Experiment show a 
significant main effect for political preference F(3, 461) = 33.475, p < .001,  η² = .199.   
There was a nonsignificant effect for the official language experimental treatment 
conditions F(6, 461) = 1.170, p < .32, η² = .009 overall.  
Between subject effects yielded significant results when the independent 
variable of political identity is compared with each dependent variable of attitude. The 
relationship between political identity and attitude towards favoring English as the 
official language of the United States is F(1, 461) = 85.040, p < .001, η² = .173. The 
relationship between political identity and attitude of whether the US should or should 
not have an official language is F(1, 461) = 90.078, p <.001, η² = .181. The 
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relationship between political identity and attitude towards whether making English 
the official language of the US is a mistake is F(1, 461) = 68.042, p < .001, η² = .143. 
Between subject effects yielded insignificant results when the independent 
variable of the official language experimental conditions are compared with each 
dependent variable of attitude. The relationship between the official language 
experiment and attitude favoring English as the official language of the United States 
is F(2, 461) = 2.462, p <..087, η² = .012. The relationship between the official 
language experiment and attitude of whether the US should or should not have an 
official language is F(2, 461) = 1.657, p < .192, η² = .008. The relationship between 
the English language experiment and attitude towards whether making English the 
official language of the US is a mistake is F(2, 461) = 1.881, p < .154, η² = .009.  
 While no significant results came about from the overall experimental 
treatment, significant results did occur under the specific frames of the experiment. 
Under the dependent variable “I am in favor of making English the official language 
of the United States”, the fairness frame was significant p < .05 when compared with 
the control. The remainder of the moral frames were not significant when compared 
with the control.  
 
 
 34 
 
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
Fa
vo
r E
ng
lis
h 
(1
-s
tr 
di
sa
gr
ee
, 7
-s
tr 
ag
re
e)
Co
ntr
ol
Fa
irn
es
s
Lo
ya
lty
 
 
 
 
 
 
Republicans
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democrats
3
3.
5
4
4.
5
5
5.
5
N
o 
U
S 
O
ff.
 L
ng
 (1
-s
tr 
di
sg
re
e;
 7
-s
tr 
ag
re
e)
Co
ntr
ol
Fa
irn
es
s
Lo
ya
lty
 
 
 
 
 
 
Republicans
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democrats
Figure 4: I am in Favor of making English the Official Language of the United States 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: There is no need for a United States official language 
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Figure 6: Making English the official language of the United States would be a 
mistake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More specifically, Hypothesis 2 states that a Conservative issue reframed with 
individualizing moral language will have a conservatively persuasive effect on 
liberals. The data supports this notion but was not statistically significant. On the 
question of whether respondents were in favor of English as the official language of 
the United States, Democrats in the control (M = 4.38, SD = 1.631) were less in favor 
of creating an official language than democrats in the fairness frame (M = 3.76, SD = 
1.779) and the loyalty frame (M = 4.04, SD = 1.764). The fairness frame was most 
effective in persuading democrats. Republican responses were more stagnant, with the 
control (M = 2.43, SD = 1.424) more closely aligned with the fairness frame (M = 
2.29, SD = 1.208). The fairness frame in this variable was effective in persuading both 
republicans and democrats. See Appendix H for full table of descriptive statistics.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
The initial goal of this research project was to find a way to use preexisting 
knowledge of an individual’s traits to persuade them on an issue they might not 
otherwise agree with. However, in conducting this study and analyzing the results, the 
implications towards both interpersonal communication and public discourse as a 
whole play an equally crucial role in understanding the causes and effects of the 
language we use every day.  
Overall, political preference was statistically significant in predicting 
differences in respondent’s attitudes. As expected, Republican and Democratic 
respondents held pointedly different opinions towards each of the issues discussed. 
Outside of the hypotheses, the results seem to confirm that the use of moral language 
in political scenarios does, in fact, lead to persuasion. While the overall experiments 
were not significant when compared with the dependent variables overall, some of the 
independent moral frames were statistically significant, leading to interesting and 
unplanned conclusions of this study. These findings could heavily implicate many 
sectors, and the information discussed should be used intentionally and cautiously. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that a liberal message, framed with binding language 
that Conservatives would resonate with, would be liberally persuasive to 
Conservatives. Although the purity frame did move the average answer towards 
agreement for each of the three dependent variables, it was not statistically significant. 
However, the fairness frame was effective in persuading Republican respondents to 
agree with a liberal message. While attitude did shift compared with the control, this 
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finding is at odds with the hypothesis, which projected that fairness language would 
not persuade Republican respondents. As predicted, Liberal respondent attitudes 
remained stagnant within both the fairness and the purity frames, compared with the 
control in each of the three dependent variables. This finding is, however, in line with 
an initial study by Haidt and Graham in 2007 which found that Conservatives may 
recognize all five moral foundations, whereas Liberals can only recognize three. 
Additionally, multiple studies found that differences between Liberals and 
Conservatives may have been overexaggerated in original research (Frimer et al., 
2013; Graham et al., 2012).  
Hypothesis 2 stated that a conservative message, framed with individualizing 
language that Liberals would resonate with, would be conservatively persuasive to 
Liberals. In this experiment, the fairness frame was indeed effective and statistically 
significant in persuading Liberals to agree with making English the official language 
of the United States. Interestingly, the fairness frame was also effective in persuading 
Conservatives to agree with the argument. Further, the loyalty frame was not only not 
effective, but seemed to push both Conservatives and Liberals away from the overall 
argument, directly contradicting the hypothesis. These findings are also at odds with 
the Day et al. 2014 study which showed that Liberals were not susceptible to 
persuasive campaigns in the way that Conservatives were. In contrast, this thesis finds 
that both Liberal and Conservative respondents were equally responsive to the 
persuasive framing of this experiment. 
Given that the fairness frame was most effective across the board, the 
implication of fairness language on depolarization is worth further investigation. It 
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was not hypothesized that the fairness frame would be able to persuade both Liberals 
and Conservatives, suggesting that depolarization may be possible, and should be 
further tested. The consistent language within this frame included terms like “equality, 
justice, care, opportunities”, and seemed to resonate with all of the respondents, 
evenly. As mentioned above, Conservatives do in fact recognize all five morals, where 
Liberals only recognize three (Haidt & Graham 2007). This is in accordance with this 
study’s findings, where Republicans and Liberals were both persuaded by fairness 
arguments. 
Equally as worthy of a further conversation is why the loyalty frame seemed 
not to work. One potential explanation for this could be that this was the only passage 
I wrote myself, where the other passages were written and empirically tested in the 
original study. In other words, the language used may have been too harsh, and 
possibly pushed people in the other direction. However, given that a portion of the 
passage was taken directly from the language used in the 2016 Republican National 
Convention’s Official Platform, these results raise questions about how and why 
Americans still hold on to these attitudes of loyalty, where they did not during this 
experiment. Nevertheless, this example could be a testament to how polarization 
works, where the other experiments seem to support the idea of depolarization. 
Strength of argument could be one potential confounding variable, given that 
the arguments in the original study were strong and well supported, alongside the use 
of moral language. Adding an additional frame with new language might be fine in 
theory, but perhaps was not as well researched and implemented as the original 
researcher’s passages. The passages also varied in their core arguments. For example, 
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while the assumption is that fairness language made the health care argument stronger, 
only the purity argument used polarizing medical terms like tuberculosis and hepatitis. 
The presence of those terms may have been the persuasive factor rather than moral 
language, or the argument itself. In the future, researchers should be very intentional 
about the argument formation process to establish nearly parallel arguments in all 
areas except for moral language. 
 Alternatively, demographic likely played a large role in explaining the results 
that did not align with the initial researcher’s data. My survey respondents were nearly 
all traditional college-aged students, at a public State University, in Rhode Island – a 
historically blue state, with the socioeconomic privilege of access to education. 
Though a significant sample of respondents identified as Republican, it is possible that 
these respondents might identify as “fiscal” Conservatives, but very well may be more 
socially liberal. Alternatively, respondents overall may be first learning about the 
world of politics, political science, and United States government as young adults. 
Many participants were just barely of voting age, making pliability a potential 
confounding variable as well. Generational differences are therefore likely a factor in 
the overall results. Given that fairness language has so frequently been found to 
especially resonate with this particular generation of younger individuals, this may 
also explain the variance in fairness language from the original study’s findings.  
It is for this specific reason that the first and most critical future consideration 
would be to retest this study on the American public rather than college students, 
alone. Because initial results are promising, it would be a critical test to determine 
how the majority of Americans respond to such questioning and persuasion. I would 
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speculate that fairness language, though effective when tested with college students, 
may not be as persuasive to Americans as a whole. Given that the RNC used exact 
language in its official 2016 platform, and won, it’s very possible that this language is 
not as off-putting to the majority of the country as it is to young college students. One 
potential explanation for this is that, while loyalty language pushes the younger 
generation(s) away from the argument, the same language may pull other generations 
in an opposite attitudinal direction. Paying closer attention to these generational 
differences in a future study would be a critical variable to test for to determine where 
people fall across the spectrum. 
It should also be a focus for future researchers to take the core findings of this 
study and replicate them outside of American politics. For example, moral language 
was originally established and tested within the realm of political science but should 
be tested elsewhere to draw a general big picture about the ways in which persuasion 
can occur. Can moral arguments be used within a corporate organization? 
Interculturally? Can the same language be used, or would a new set of terms be 
needed to accurately describe the setting? These are all questions worth investigating, 
and future research could replicate this study in a different sphere to determine what 
kind of language influences perception in different domains. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Given the scope of this topic and the present-day relevance of political 
polarization, a negative – but understandable – outlook might be whether the findings 
of this research could be used to manipulate others for political gain or attempt to use 
polarization as a weapon for further disagreement and national unrest. While the 
positive cannot exist without the negative, the overall existence of polarization does 
seem to be unintentional. With the intentional introduction of a way to decrease 
political disagreement, one would hope that this information can be used both 
intentionally and critically for public good. 
 Nevertheless, these finding suggest that there are very real ways to introduce 
value in an opposing stance, and to unify divided attitudes both interpersonally and in 
the realm of public discourse. With this information, government officials, journalists, 
instructors, business leaders, and especially the average American citizen can speak 
more intentionally and use specific language to help others see their own point of 
view.  
 It’s true that, if the survey respondents had been presented with a follow-up 
questionnaire, the odds of these attitudes remaining consistent are highly unlikely 
However, what we know about persuasion is that it’s subtle, it’s largely unnoticeable 
to the subject, and that it happens over time. The implications to the greater political 
atmosphere in America are therefore especially important. The power of the language 
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we use is immense, and the sooner we use this knowledge intentionally, the sooner we 
can begin to find a common ground. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Demographic Questions 
Q1 Which category below includes your age? 
18-24  
25-34  
35-44  
45-54  
55-64 
65 or older    
 
Q2 Which race/ethnicity best describes you? Please choose only one. 
American Indian or Alaskan Native  
Asian/Pacific Islander 
Black or African-American 
Hispanic 
White  
Other (please specify) 
 
Q3 What is your gender? 
Male 
Female  
Other (please specify)  
 
Q4 What was the total combined income of all members of your household in 2018? 
$0-$9,999 
$10,000 – $19,999 
$20,000 – $29,999 
$30,000 - $39,999  
$40,000 – $49,999 
$50,000 – $59,999 
$60,000 – $69,999 
$70,000 – $79,999 
$80,000 – $89,999 
$90,000 – $99,999  
$100,000 or more 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Political Identity Questions 
 
Q5 With what political party do you most identify? 
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Strong Democrat 
Moderate Democrat 
Independent 
Moderate Republican 
Strong Republican 
Not sure 
 
Follow up question(s) if Independent/Not Sure 
 
Q6 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democrats or the Republicans? 
Democrats 
Republicans 
Not sure 
 
Follow up question(s) if Republican  
 
Q7 How important is being Republican to you? 
Extremely important 
Very important  
Slightly important  
Not at all important 
  
Q8 Indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
When people criticize Republicans, it feels like a personal insult. 
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
 
When I meet someone who supports the Republicans, I feel connected.  
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
 
When people praise Republicans, it makes me feel good.  
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
 
Follow up question(s) if Democrat 
 
Q9 How important is being Democrat to you? 
Extremely important 
Very important 
Slightly important  
Not at all important  
 
Q10 Indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
When people criticize Democrats, it feels like a personal insult.  
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
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When I meet someone who supports the Democrats, I feel connected. 
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
 
When people praise Democrats, it makes me feel good.  
Strongly disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) Somewhat agree (3) Strongly agree (4) 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Feeling Thermometers 
 
Q11 Use the feeling thermometer to rate your personal feelings toward the policies 
below by sliding the scale to any value on the thermometer between 1 and 7. The 
warmer or more favorable you feel toward the policy, the higher the number you 
should give it. The colder or less favorable you feel, the lower the number.  If you feel 
neither warm nor cold toward the policy, rate it 4.  
Extremely unfavorable                Neutral  Extremely favorable 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q11-1 Same Sex Marriage  
Q11-2 Adopting English as the Official Language of the United States 
Q11-3 Military Spending 
Q11-4 Universal Health Care  
 
 
Appendix D 
 
TIPI Scale (Ten Item Personality Scale) 
 
Q12 I see myself as: 
 
Q12-1 Extraverted, enthusiastic 
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-2 Critical, quarrelsome 
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
  
Q12-3 Dependable, self-disciplined  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-4 Anxious, easily upset 
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Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
  
Q12-5 Open to new experiences, complex  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
  
Q12-6 Reserved, quiet  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-7 Sympathetic, warm 
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-8 Disorganized, careless  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-9 Calm, emotionally stable  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Q12-10 Conventional, uncreative 
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Appendix E 
 
Experiment 1 – Universal Health Care 
 
Passage 1: Purity frame 
 
“Health Care for Everyone” 
  
The absence of universal healthcare in the United States practically ensures that we 
will have unclean, infected, and diseased Americans walking among us. The uninsured 
often develop “diseases of poverty”, such as tuberculosis, hepatitis, toxocariasis, and 
other viruses or parasites that can easily spread throughout the population. Many of 
these diseases have grotesque symptoms like yellowing of the skin and eyes, coughing 
up bloody mucus, itchy rashes, and lesions. These diseases are contagious and spread 
through the population infecting many, including those who are not poor.  
  
The spread of these diseases, however, would be easily preventable if all Americans 
had healthcare. Individuals infected with these contagious diseases would become 
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much less likely to spread their sickness to others, because doctors could provide them 
with medicine to cure or control the disease, and doctors could educate these sick 
patients on how to avoid infecting others.  
  
The uninsured are especially susceptible to contracting infectious diseases because 
they are often the poorest among us, suffering from malnutrition and stress, both of 
which lead to weakened immune systems. So, this means that the uninsured tend to 
serve as repositories that harbor and cultivate contagions which can then, after 
incubating, more easily spread to others in the population. Overall, universal 
healthcare is a way of purifying America from some of its most infectious diseases, 
making it less and less likely that healthy individuals will ever encounter these 
diseases. Everyone should have healthcare. 
 
 
Passage 2: Fairness frame 
 
“Health Care for Everyone” 
  
In its current state healthcare in the U.S. is inherently unfair and unjust. We need 
reform to ensure that everyone, not just the rich and the fortunate, has access to the 
doctors and the medicine they need.  
  
An estimated 50 million American citizens are without adequate insurance coverage – 
including millions of children who have done nothing wrong. Because most American 
families obtain healthcare coverage from long term employers, the blue-collar sector 
of the labor force is unfairly hit the hardest. These laborers typically work for hourly 
wages in temporary jobs which do not offer comprehensive health insurance. These 
are honest, law-abiding citizens who are being unfairly denied access to resources 
their wealthier counterparts are entitled to, simply because they make less money.  
  
To make matters worse, the poorest are often the ones who are at the highest risk for 
health problems. Individuals in the lower economic brackets suffer more diabetes, 
cancer, asthma, emphysema, hypertension, and heart disease largely due to the 
financial stress they experience on a day-to-day basis. They are the ones who need 
healthcare the most, but unjustly are the ones who have the least access to it. Health 
care is a human right and should be accessible to all. 
 
 
Attitude Questions 
 
Indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements.   
  
I am in favor of universal health care.    
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
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There is no need for universal health care in America. 
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
  
Universal health care will help solve many of America's problems.  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
 
Appendix F 
 
Experiment 2 – Making English the Official Language of the United States 
 
Passage 1: Fairness frame 
 
"Leveling the Playing Field with English"   
    
When immigrants come to America they have a choice – learn English or not. Many 
choose to not learn it. Who can blame them? It is not easy learning another language. 
But the choice to not learn English puts these new immigrants at an extreme 
disadvantage in society. Immigrants who do not speak English earn substantially less 
money, are rarely treated as equal members of society, and are often discriminated 
against. For these reasons, we should make English the official language of the US. 
Doing so will not force immigrants to stop speaking their native language, it will 
simply push them to learn English so they have a greater chance of succeeding and 
being treated more equally by other members of society.    
    
Immigrants who do not speak English are often treated unfairly in their day-to-day 
lives – even discriminated against. They face a phenomenon called “language 
discrimination”, where they are treated unfairly and as second-class citizens because 
they do not speak English. People often ignore them or deny them services (for 
example, they won’t be seated at restaurants), they will be treated worse by authorities 
(for example, police officers will treat them more like criminals when being 
interviewed), and they even receive harsher sentencing in court.    
    
Making English the official language of the United States will help level the playing 
field for these immigrants. It will compel them to learn English and will authorize the 
government to provide learning support for them. Instead of paying millions of tax 
dollars (an estimated $260 million each year) on translating documents, we should 
invest in helping them learning English. Making English the official language is key to 
giving all immigrants an equal opportunity at succeeding in America.   
 
 
Passage 2: Loyalty frame 
 
“English is the Language of our Homeland”  
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When immigrants come to America they have a choice – learn English or not. Many 
choose to not learn it. Why wouldn’t they? If they expect to become true American 
citizens, it’s only respectful to assimilate to American tradition. But the choice to not 
learn English makes these new immigrants defiant to our society and culture.    
    
English has been our nation’s primary language for hundreds of years, and outsiders 
coming in should know that we value tradition. The greatest asset to our American 
way is the hardworking American. True patriotic families know this, and if 
immigrants wish to join the American community in solidarity, learning English is a 
necessity.    
    
We are particularly grateful to the thousands of new legal immigrants, many of them 
not yet citizens, who are serving in the Armed Forces and among first responders. 
Their patriotism inspires other immigrates to follow the rules and respect the Laws of 
this great country. To that end, we both encourage the preservation of heritage tongues 
and support English as the nation’s official language, a unifying force essential for the 
advancement of immigrant communities and our nation as a whole. Together, we can 
make our country better. 
 
 
Attitude Questions 
 
Indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements. 
 
I am in favor of making English the official language of the United States.  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
The United States should not have an official language.  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
Making English the official language of US would be mistake.  
Strongly agree (1)    Agree (2)    Somewhat agree (3)    Neither agree nor disagree (4)    
Somewhat disagree (5)    Disagree (6)    Strongly disagree (7) 
 
 
Appendix G 
 
Alternative to study: Big Five Personality Trait Short Questionnaire (BFPTSQ) 
 
I see myself as someone who . . . 
Openness 
Is original, often has new ideas. 
Is curious about many different things. 
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Is ingenious, reflects a lot. 
Has a lot of imagination. 
Is inventive, creative. 
Likes artistic or aesthetic experiences. 
Is not really interested in different cultures, their customs and values. Likes to reflect, 
tries to understand complex things. 
Has few artistic interests. 
Is sophisticated when it comes to art, music or literature.  
 
Extraversion 
Likes to talk, expresses his/her opinion. 
Is reserved or shy, has difficulty approaching others. 
Is full of energy, likes to always be active. 
Is a leader, capable of convincing others. 
Is rather quiet, does not talk a lot. 
Shows self-confidence, is able to assert himself/herself. 
Is timid, shy. 
Is extraverted, sociable. 
Likes exciting activities, which provide thrills. 
Has a tendency to laugh and have fun easily. 
 
Agreeableness 
Has a tendency to criticize others. 
Is helpful and generous with others. 
Provokes quarrels or arguments with others. 
Is lenient, forgives easily. 
Generally trusts others. 
Can be distant and cold towards others. 
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone. 
Can sometimes be rude or mean towards others. 
Likes to cooperate with others. 
Can deceive and manipulate people to get what he/she want.  
 
Conscientiousness 
Works conscientiously, does the things he/she has to do well. 
Can be a little careless and negligent. 
Is a reliable student/worker, who can be counted on. 
Has a tendency to be disorganized, messy. 
Has a tendency to be lazy. 
Perseveres until the task at hand is completed. 
Does things efficiently, works well and quickly. 
Plans things that need to be done and follows through the plans. 
Is easily distracted, has difficulty remaining attentive. 
Can do things impulsively without thinking about the consequences.  
 
Emotional Stability 
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Has a tendency to be easily depressed, sad. 
Is generally relaxed, handles stress well. 
Can be tense, stressed out. 
Worries a lot about many things. 
Is emotionally stable, not easily upset. 
Can be moody. 
Stays calm in tense or stressful situations. 
Can easily become nervous. 
Has a tendency to feel inferior to others. 
Has a tendency to be easily irritated.  
 
 
Appendix H 
 
Data Analysis Tables 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Official Language) 
 
2 category political 
id: includes polid 
followup 
respondents 0-
Dem, 1-Rep 
experimental 
conditions for 
English Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
combined 
responses - favor 
making English 
official language 
Democrats Control 4.38 1.631 91 
Fairness 3.79 1.779 87 
Loyalty 4.04 1.764 89 
Total 4.08 1.736 267 
Republicans Control 2.43 1.424 46 
Fairness 2.29 1.208 49 
Loyalty 2.86 1.625 51 
Total 2.53 1.444 146 
Total Control 3.73 1.813 137 
Fairness 3.25 1.750 136 
Loyalty 3.61 1.802 140 
Total 3.53 1.796 413 
combined 
responses - US 
should not have an 
official language 
Democrats Control 3.02 1.520 91 
Fairness 3.47 1.627 87 
Loyalty 3.38 1.620 89 
Total 3.29 1.595 267 
Republicans Control 4.96 1.619 46 
Fairness 5.14 1.646 49 
Loyalty 4.57 1.857 51 
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Total 4.88 1.720 146 
Total Control 3.67 1.799 137 
Fairness 4.07 1.816 136 
Loyalty 3.81 1.798 140 
Total 3.85 1.807 413 
combined 
responses - making 
English official lang 
is a mistake 
Democrats Control 3.68 1.591 91 
Fairness 3.99 1.681 87 
Loyalty 3.88 1.622 89 
Total 3.85 1.630 267 
Republicans Control 5.39 1.390 46 
Fairness 5.45 1.459 49 
Loyalty 4.78 1.736 51 
Total 5.20 1.561 146 
Total Control 4.26 1.724 137 
Fairness 4.51 1.747 136 
Loyalty 4.21 1.715 140 
Total 4.32 1.730 413 
 
 
Post Hoc Tests - experimental conditions for English 
Multiple Comparisons 
Bonferroni   
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for English 
(J) experimental 
conditions for English 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
combined responses - 
favor making English 
official language 
Control Fairness .48* 
Loyalty .12 
Fairness Control -.48* 
Loyalty -.36 
Loyalty Control -.12 
Fairness .36 
combined responses - 
US should not have an 
official language 
Control Fairness -.40 
Loyalty -.14 
Fairness Control .40 
Loyalty .26 
Loyalty Control .14 
Fairness -.26 
combined responses - Control Fairness -.26 
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making English official 
lang is a mistake 
Loyalty .05 
Fairness Control .26 
Loyalty .31 
Loyalty Control -.05 
Fairness -.31 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for English 
(J) experimental 
conditions for English Std. Error Sig. 
combined responses - 
favor making English 
official language 
Control Fairness .197 .046 
Loyalty .196 1.000 
Fairness Control .197 .046 
Loyalty .196 .192 
Loyalty Control .196 1.000 
Fairness .196 .192 
combined responses - 
US should not have an 
official language 
Control Fairness .198 .128 
Loyalty .196 1.000 
Fairness Control .198 .128 
Loyalty .197 .565 
Loyalty Control .196 1.000 
Fairness .197 .565 
combined responses - 
making English official 
lang is a mistake 
Control Fairness .194 .545 
Loyalty .192 1.000 
Fairness Control .194 .545 
Loyalty .193 .333 
Loyalty Control .192 1.000 
Fairness .193 .333 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for English 
(J) experimental 
conditions for English 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound 
combined responses - 
favor making English 
Control Fairness .01 
Loyalty -.35 
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official language Fairness Control -.95 
Loyalty -.84 
Loyalty Control -.59 
Fairness -.11 
combined responses - 
US should not have an 
official language 
Control Fairness -.88 
Loyalty -.61 
Fairness Control -.07 
Loyalty -.21 
Loyalty Control -.33 
Fairness -.73 
combined responses - 
making English official 
lang is a mistake 
Control Fairness -.72 
Loyalty -.41 
Fairness Control -.21 
Loyalty -.16 
Loyalty Control -.51 
Fairness -.77 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for English 
(J) experimental 
conditions for English 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Upper Bound 
combined responses - 
favor making English 
official language 
Control Fairness .95 
Loyalty .59 
Fairness Control -.01 
Loyalty .11 
Loyalty Control .35 
Fairness .84 
combined responses - US 
should not have an official 
language 
Control Fairness .07 
Loyalty .33 
Fairness Control .88 
Loyalty .73 
Loyalty Control .61 
Fairness .21 
combined responses - 
making English official 
Control Fairness .21 
Loyalty .51 
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lang is a mistake Fairness Control .72 
Loyalty .77 
Loyalty Control .41 
Fairness .16 
 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 2.560. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Descriptive Statistics – health care experiment 
 
2 category political 
id: includes polid 
followup 
respondents 0-Dem, 
1-Rep 
experimental 
conditions for health 
care Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
combined responses 
- favor universal 
health care 
Democrats Control 2.03 1.198 79 
Purity 1.85 1.010 91 
Fairness 1.87 1.017 97 
Total 1.91 1.070 267 
Republicans Control 4.27 1.634 52 
Purity 3.96 1.865 51 
Fairness 3.63 1.648 43 
Total 3.97 1.730 146 
Total Control 2.92 1.767 131 
Purity 2.61 1.709 142 
Fairness 2.41 1.483 140 
Total 2.64 1.665 413 
combined responses 
- no need for 
universal health care 
Democrats Control 6.08 1.130 79 
Purity 6.15 1.064 91 
Fairness 6.11 1.163 97 
Total 6.12 1.116 267 
Republicans Control 3.94 1.626 52 
Purity 4.25 1.820 51 
Fairness 4.65 1.660 43 
Total 4.26 1.718 146 
Total Control 5.23 1.703 131 
Purity 5.47 1.653 142 
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Fairness 5.66 1.492 140 
Total 5.46 1.622 413 
combined responses 
- universal health 
care will solve US 
problems 
Democrats Control 2.61 1.295 79 
Purity 2.37 1.102 91 
Fairness 2.63 1.325 97 
Total 2.54 1.245 267 
Republicans Control 4.62 1.817 52 
Purity 4.37 1.587 51 
Fairness 4.02 1.752 43 
Total 4.36 1.725 146 
Total Control 3.40 1.809 131 
Purity 3.09 1.611 142 
Fairness 3.06 1.599 140 
Total 3.18 1.676 413 
 
 
Post Hoc Tests - experimental conditions for health care 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Bonferroni   
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for health care 
(J) experimental 
conditions for health care 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
combined responses - 
favor universal health 
care 
Control Purity .31 
Fairness .51* 
Purity Control -.31 
Fairness .20 
Fairness Control -.51* 
Purity -.20 
combined responses - no 
need for universal health 
care 
Control Purity -.24 
Fairness -.44* 
Purity Control .24 
Fairness -.19 
Fairness Control .44* 
Purity .19 
combined responses - 
universal health care will 
solve US problems 
Control Purity .31 
Fairness .35 
Purity Control -.31 
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Fairness .03 
Fairness Control -.35 
Purity -.03 
 
Multiple Comparisons – health care experiment 
Bonferroni   
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental 
conditions for health 
care 
(J) experimental 
conditions for health 
care Std. Error Sig. 
combined responses - 
favor universal health 
care 
Control Purity .162 .168 
Fairness .162 .006 
Purity Control .162 .168 
Fairness .159 .640 
Fairness Control .162 .006 
Purity .159 .640 
combined responses - 
no need for universal 
health care 
Control Purity .164 .420 
Fairness .165 .026 
Purity Control .164 .420 
Fairness .161 .701 
Fairness Control .165 .026 
Purity .161 .701 
combined responses - 
universal health care will 
solve US problems 
Control Purity .173 .214 
Fairness .174 .139 
Purity Control .173 .214 
Fairness .170 1.000 
Fairness Control .174 .139 
Purity .170 1.000 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental conditions 
for health care 
(J) experimental conditions 
for health care 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower Bound 
combined responses - 
favor universal health care 
Control Purity -.08 
Fairness .12 
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Purity Control -.70 
Fairness -.18 
Fairness Control -.90 
Purity -.58 
combined responses - no 
need for universal health 
care 
Control Purity -.64 
Fairness -.83 
Purity Control -.15 
Fairness -.58 
Fairness Control .04 
Purity -.20 
combined responses - 
universal health care will 
solve US problems 
Control Purity -.10 
Fairness -.07 
Purity Control -.73 
Fairness -.37 
Fairness Control -.77 
Purity -.44 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) experimental conditions 
for health care 
(J) experimental conditions 
for health care 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Upper Bound 
combined responses - 
favor universal health care 
Control Purity .70 
Fairness .90 
Purity Control .08 
Fairness .58 
Fairness Control -.12 
Purity .18 
combined responses - no 
need for universal health 
care 
Control Purity .15 
Fairness -.04 
Purity Control .64 
Fairness .20 
Fairness Control .83 
Purity .58 
combined responses - 
universal health care will 
solve US problems 
Control Purity .73 
Fairness .77 
Purity Control .10 
Fairness .44 
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Fairness Control .07 
Purity .37 
 
Based on observed means. 
 The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 2.044. 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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